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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Costin timely appeals from the district court's order revoking probation, 
requiring him to serve the previously imposed sentence of five years, with two years 
fixed, which he received for ~1is guilty plea to felony injury to a child. In addition, 
Mr. Costin timely appeals from the district court's order denying his request for leniency 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 
On appeal, Mr. Costin argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process of law when it refused to augment the record with a transcript of a probation 
violation admission hearing. Additionally, Mr. Costin argues that the district court 
abused its discretion when it revoked probation and denied his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Costin and C. B. had known each other for five years. (R., p.10.) When 
Mr. Costin was eighteen years old, he had sexual intercourse with C.B., who was fifteen 
years old. (R., pp.9-10.) According to one of the police reports, "[i]t is clear the "victim" 
[C.B.], was the person who initiated the sexual contact. According to the doctor, due to 
[C.B.] admitting the sexual contact was consensual, he would not complete a sexual 
assault exam." (R., p.13.) 
Mr. Costin was charged, by information, with rape. (R., pp.29-30.) Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Mr. Costin pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of felony injury to 
children. (10/30/08 Tr., p.4, Ls.5-23; R., p.40.) Thereafter, the district court entered an 
order withholding judgment, and placed Mr. Costin on probation. (R., pp.55-57.) 
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After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation, alleging 
that Mr. Costin violated various terms of his probation. (R., pp.74-77.) An evidentiary 
hearing was held, and the district court found that Mr. Costin had violated his probation 
for failing to provide truthful information during a polygraph examination, for failing to 
submit to a polygraph examination, for changing residences without prior approval from 
his probation officer, for failing to submit to a random drug test, for failing to report to his 
probation officer, and for failing to pay restitution. (R., pp.74-76, 85.) Thereafter, the 
district court revoked probation and imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two 
years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.88-90.) Upon review of Mr. Costin's period 
of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court placed Mr. Costin on 
probation. (R., pp.95-96.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation, alleging 
that Mr. Costin violated various terms of his probation. (R., pp.114-119.) Mr. Costin 
admitted to violating twelve terms of his probation and, at an evidentiary hearing, the 
district court found that Mr. Costin also violated a term of his probation for failing to 
enter into a specialized sex offender treatment program. (05/17/11 Tr., p.50- Ls.6-13.) 
Thereafter, the district court revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence. 
(R., pp.141-142.) Mr. Costin timely appealed. (R., pp.143-146.) 
Mr. Costin also filed an I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency (R., pp.147-148), 
which was denied by the district court. (August 8, 2011, Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35 (hereinafter, Order 
Denying I.C.R. 35 Motion), pp.1-2.) 
On appeal, Mr. Costin's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment and 
suspend the briefing schedule, wherein appellate counsel requested that the record on 
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appeal be augmented with various transcripts. (IVlotion to Augment), pp.1-6.) The State 
objected to Mr. Costin's request for a transcript of the probation violation admission 
hearing, held on August 17, 2009. (Objection in Part to "Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof," (hereinafter, 
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-6.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered 
its Order, wherein it partially granted Mr. Costin's Motion to Augment, but denied the 
request for the probation violation admission hearing, held on August 17, 2009. 
(Order), pp.1-2.)1 
1 A transcript of the probation violation admission hearing, held on August 17, 2009, 
was prepared by the district court, and the Idaho Supreme Court then entered its Order 
for Preparation of a Revised Supplemental Transcript on Appeal, wherein the Supreme 
Court ordered that the copies of the original supplemental transcript be returned to the 
to the court reporter, and ordered the court reporter to prepare a revised supplemental 
transcript on appeal, omitting the transcript of the probation violation admission hearing 
held on August 17, 2009. (Order for Preparation of a Revised Supplemental Transcript 
on Appeal, pp.1-2.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Costin due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcript? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked probation and executed 
the underlying sentence? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Costin's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of his progress during 
incarceration? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Costin Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcript 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a court can constitutionally 
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove 
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Costin filed a Motion to Augment, requesting, inter alia, a 
transcript of the probation violation admission hearing, held August 17, 2009, wherein 
he argued that, when determining whether to revoke probaiton, a district court can 
consider all of the hearings before and after sentencing. On appeal, Mr. Costin is 
challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcript of the 
August 17, 2011, probation violation admission hearing. Mr. Costin asserts that the 
requested transcript is relevant to the district court's decision to revoke probation 
because that decision was made after sentencing, and the district court could have, 
therefore, relied on its memory of that hearing when it decided to revoke probation and 
execute the underlying sentences. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in 
denying Mr. Costin's request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Costin Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested 
Transcript 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court1 By Failing To Provide Mr. Costin With 
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His 
Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. 
I §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 
Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense. I. C. § 1-1105(2); 
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. 
I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54. 7 further enables a district court to 
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''order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from 
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct App. 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases. 
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection 
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants 
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the 
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do 
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet 
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must 
provide indigent defendants with appellate records unless some or all of the requested 
materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
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themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the state argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863}. In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that an 
appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate 
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of 
the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial 
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999}. If the transcripts are missing, 
but the record contains court minutes, that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful 
review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, although the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
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"strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to 
provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 
491 (Ct App. 1999). In this case, Mr. Costin intends to raise as an issue on appeal the 
question of whether the district court erred in revoking his probation at the May 17, 
2011, probation violation disposition hearing. At that hearing, the district court made an 
express reference Mr. Costin's prior probation violations, the disposition of which 
occurred at the August 17, 2009, probation violation admit/deny hearing. The district 
court's comments follow: 
Your first report of probation violation back in July of 2009 was 
serious. Not doing the drug testing, you're not doing the polygraph test. 
Tried to find out the extent of your problem, so you do a rider .... 
(05/17/11 Tr., p.65, L23 - p.66, L.1.) 
[T]here's been nothing that you've done in the last three years that we've 
known each other that would indicate that you're at all serious about 
dealing with your situation .... 
(05/17/11 Tr., p.67, Ls.12-15.) Since the district court used the 2009 probation 
violations as an aggravating factor when it revoked Mr. Costin's probation in 2011, 
appellate counsel needs access to the transcript of the August 17, 2009, hearing in 
order to determine whether there was mitigating testimony introduced which could rebut 
the district court's characterization of the 2009 probation violations. If Mr. Costin fails to 
provide the appellate court with the requested item, the legal presumption will apply and 
Mr. Costin's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action 
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a 
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
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Additionally, a transcript of the above probation violation admit deny hearing, 
where Mr. Costin comments on his own behalf, (R., pp.83-84) is relevant and is 
necessary to determine, for instance, whether Mr. Costin either agreed to additional 
conditions of probation, thus mooting a claim that his probation was revoked on 
conditions that were not conditions of probation, or whether the court referenced any of 
its prior hearings in ultimately revoking probation and therefore, are relevant not only to 
the potential merits of the issues but also to create a complete record on appeal. ( See 
State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App., 2000) ("Burdett has 
failed to include the transcript from his change of plea hearing wherein, according to the 
district court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his guilty plea. Portions 
of a transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district 
court."). 
Further, the requested item is within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. 
The transcript of the combined probation violation admission and dispositional hearing 
is relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings following sentencing 
when determining whether the court appropriately relinquished jurisdiction. State v. 
Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 289 (Ct. App. 2010); see also State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
26, (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution 
following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events 
before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing 
when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation.") (emphasis added). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of 
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proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Costin's Motion to Augment will 
render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript 
supports the district court's order revoking probation. This functions as a procedural bar 
to the review of Mr. Costin's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, 
Mr. Costin should either be provided with the requested transcript or the presumption 
should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Costin With 
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In doing so, the United State Supreme Court reasoned that the ability to 
be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the denial of counsel 
is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court 
also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was so vital and 
imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a 
denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [to] hold 
otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that there 
are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free 
government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 65. (quoting 
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the 
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right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United State Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of ~lis client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcript has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of 
the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether 
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor 
of any argument made or undercutting any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Costin has 
not obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided 
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the starting point of evaluating 
whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. 
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These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel. 
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should 
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcript, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might affect the district court's decision 
to revoke probation. Further, appellate counsel is also unable to advise Mr. Costin on 
the probable role the transcript may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Costin is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcript. 
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Costin his constitutional right to 
due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. 
Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested 
transcript and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental 
briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Costin's Probation And 
Executed The Underlying Sentence 
A. Introduction 
This is a case of an eighteen year old high school student who had sex with 
another student. The sex was initiated by the victim. Mr. Costin was college bound, but 
got involved in the criminal justice system. While Mr. Costin was not a good 
probationer, he was not committing new crimes. Therefore, it the district court abused 
its discretion when it revoked Mr. Costin's probation. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Costin's Probation 
And Executed The Underlying Sentence 
Mr. Costin asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked his probation. When a defendant appeals from an order 
revoking probation this Court has utilized the following framework: 
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation 
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the 
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation 
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct.App.1987). 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Mr. Costin concedes that he violated the terms his probation. Accordingly, he 
only contests the district court's decision to revoke his probation. "A district court's 
decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the 
court abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a 
district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived 
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the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 
(Ct. App. 2003). "In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate 
response to a violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal 
of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of 
society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
As a preliminary note, prior to the original sentencing hearing, neither the State, 
the district court, nor defense counsel thought that Mr. Costin's actions warranted a 
psychosexual evaluation. (10/30/08 Tr., p.12, L.15 - p.13, L.1.) As such, the district 
court ordered a Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), but did not order a 
psychosexual evaluation. 10/30/08 Tr., p.12, L.15 - p.13, L.12.) In fact, Mr. Costin's 
behavior was not that egregious, according to Counsel: 
The prosecutor's exactly right. This was just a real stupid thing to do. It 
was a [consensual] type of a situation where the girl called him and 
wanted him to come over and get her, and so he did, and then, you know, 
the sexual contact. She initiated it, but he should've just ... backed off. 
You know, it was just stupid, but I guess when you're eighteen, or I think 
he was just barley eighteen .... 
(12/07/08 Tr., p.22, L.17 - p.23, Ls.24.) Mr. Costin's birthday is March 29 and this 
offense occurred on May 30. (PSI, p.1.) The fact that the offense was not coercive, 
that it was initiated by the victim, and the fact Mr. Costin had barely turned 18 are all 
mitigating factors. See State v. Stiffler, 114 Idaho 935, 938 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. 
Cobell, 148 Idaho 349, 356 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Not only was Mr. Costin only eighteen at the time of sentencing, but he was also 
still in high school. (PSI, p.5.) According to counsel, "Mr. Costin's on the school 
council. He speaks on behalf of the ... school at district meetings. He was elected by 
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the teachers to do that. He's very well respected in his school. He's barely eighteen 
years of age, and he's a senior at Project." (12/07/08 Tr., p.22, Ls.9-16.) Mr. Costin 
was not a trouble maker and was focusing on finishing high school and going to college. 
(PSI, p.2.) Mr. Costin intended to attend Wyoming Tech and take courses in 
manufacturing and business management. (PSI, p.5.) 
Mr. Costin was a good student and had developed strong relationships with his 
high school teachers. One of Mr. Costin's high school teachers wrote the following: 
I have watched Adam [grow] as an individual for the past four 
years. He is a good student and a caring person. The best place for 
Adam is in school; he is on track to graduate and is an asset to my 
program. He is a leader in our school and continues to grow positively as 
an individual. 
(December 17, 2008, Letter written by Ben Higgs.) Mr. Costin's high school counselor 
wrote the following: 
I am writing regarding Adam Costin. Adam has been a student at 
Project CDA since September of 2004. It has been my pleasure to see 
Adam mature into a kind, hardworking, fun young man. 
I have been in education for 20 years and have never asked a 
student to my home for any reason but when Adam said he would be 
alone for Thanksgiving this year; I invited him to join in my festivities. I 
trust him that much. 
(12/18/08 Letter written by Jeri Midgley.) 
Mr. Costin's probation was first revoked for failing to provide truthful information 
during a polygraph examination, for failing to submit to a polygraph examination, for 
changing residences without prior approval from his probation officer, for failing to 
submit to a random drug test, for failing to report to his probation officer, and for failing 
to pay restitution. (R., pp.74-76, 85.) None of this behavior would constitute a crime. 
The reason Mr. Costin changed his residence was to go to college. (R., p.75.) For this 
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behavior, Mr. Costin's probation was revoked and he was ordered on a rider. 
(R., pp.88-90.) Mr. Costin performed well on his rider and received a probation 
recommendation from the IDOC. (Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, APSI), p.3.)2 Accordingly, the district court placed Mr. Costin on probation. 
(R., pp.95-96.) 
Turning to the probation revocation at issue on appeal, many of Mr. Costin's 
probation violations were for age appropriate sexual activities. (R., pp.114-119.) 
Concerning these violations, it is important to keep in mind that at the original change of 
plea hearing the State and the district court thought Mr. Costin's behavior did not 
warrant a psychosexual evaluation. (10/30/08 Tr., p.12, L.15 - p.13, L.1.) 
Prior to the probation violation disposition hearing, Mr. Costin had developed a 
probation plan which would have facilitated the goals of probation. According to 
counsel: 
Your Honor, our first preference, however, is that Mr. Costin be 
placed on probation. He does have a job available. He intends to go with 
substance abuse treatment I believe through Restored Paths. He does 
want to attend sex offender treatment, and he wants to do that with 
Mr. Hearn. 
Your Honor, I believe that Adam has the right attitude towards 
treatment. He knows that it's something that he needs to do. He knows 
that it's something that he wants to do. I think the Court could fashion the 
sentence where Adam's time was all used up with responsibilities with 
substance abuse treatment, with AA meetings, with sex offender 
treatment. 
2 The pages of the APSI and the attached C-Notes were not numbered. For ease of 
citation, the APSI and attached C-Notes have been numbered, beginning with the cover 
of the APSI and ending on page 8. 
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Your Honor, I think in this situation there are alternatives to simply 
imposing the sentence and sending Mr. Costin to prison at this point. 
(05/17/11 Tr., p.63, L.13 - p.64, L.16.) This plan would have facilitated Mr. Costin's 
rehabilitation and at the same time kept him too busy to engage in any behavior which 
posed a risk to society. 
In sum, Mr. Costin made some bad decisions, but when the record is viewed in 
light of his most recent probation violations there was no reason to send Mr. Costin to 
prison, in light of his proffered probation plan. Therefore, the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked Mr. Costin's probation. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Costin's Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of His Progress During 
Incarceration 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Costin provided new information which indicates that he has been performing 
well during his period of post judgment incarceration. Specifically, he is participating in 
voluntary programming, apologized to people he has wronged in the past, and began 
writing an introspective journal, with the goal of internalizing the reasons for his poor 
decisions. When this information is viewed in light of the information before the district 
court at sentencing, it supports the conclusion that his sentence is excessively harsh. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Costin's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of His Progress 
During His Incarceration 
Mr. Costin asserts that his unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, is 
excessive under any given view of the record. A motion to alter an otherwise lawful 
sentence under I.C.R. 35 is addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, 
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and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally 
imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The 
criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those 
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, 
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting 
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Costin does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Costin must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of 
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id. 
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under 
Rule 35, [the Appellate Court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the 
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to 
reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). "If the sentence was not 
excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view 
21 
of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. State v. 
Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). 
Mr. Costin provided new information in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion, which 
pertains to his progress during his most recent period of incarceration. Mr. Costin 
indicated that he was voluntarily attending a parenting class, relationships course, and 
an advanced computer literacy class. (08/03/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.15-25.) He also started a 
personal journal and had contacted people he had wronged in the past to apologize for 
his behavior. (08/03/11 Tr., p.9, L.21 - p.10, L.10.) Mr. Costin had the same job 
available to him at Traffic Corp. (08/03/11 Tr., p.12, Ls.4-10.) When asked about his 
college plans Mr. Costin stated: 
[RJight now I'm just a graduate from Project, looking into ... WyoTech. 
It's in Laramie, Wyoming. It's a mechanical trade school. I've been 
actually enrolled since my graduation at project. Um, I've already put in 
my application process to the school, and every semester they end up 
getting a hold of me asking me if I can join them that semester, and I keep 
having to tell them no because, uh, of probation requirements of not letting 
me leave the State. 
(08/03/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.14-22.) 
Additionally, there are mitigating factors present throughout this case, which 
support the conclusion that Mr. Costin's sentence is recessively harsh. These factors 
were previously articulated in Section ll(B) of this brief and are incorporated herein by 
reference thereto. 
In sum, Mr. Costin had barely turned eighteen when he had non-coercive sex 
which was initiated by the victim. At that time, Mr. Costin was a successful high school 
student and had enrolled in college to become a productive member of society. After 
his probation was revoked, Mr. Costin provided new information indicating that he has 
not given up and still is doing the things he needs to do to achieve these ends. While 
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this does not excuse his initial behavior and his subsequent probation violations, neither 
Mr. Costin nor society are benefiting from his five year prison sentence. In light of the 
foregoing, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Costin's I.C.R. 35 
motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Costin 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district 
court to place him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Costin respectfully requests that this 
Court reduce the indeterminate portions of his sentence. 
DATED this 2ih day of March, 2012. 
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